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ABSTRACT 
Two radically different views of manufacturing strategy are that it should be 
developed@om the ‘top down ’ by planned integration with corporate strategy, 
or alternatively, that it should be developed from the ‘bottom up ’ by focusing 
on improved performance by the elimination of waste. Using comparative, 
case-based research, this paper casts some light on these opposing views 
through quantitative and qualitative studies in two very different organisations. 
Within each organisation, two units of analysis were used to investigate the 
nature of the tradeoffs, and the role of best practice in manufacturing strategy 
development. A third set of proposals is made about the development of 
manufacturing strategy enablers that are available only in given situations. 
INTRODUCTION 
The literature on manufacturing strategy development can broadly be characterised by 
two distinctive points of view. The first is the top down version: manufacturing 
strategy must be developed from the top down, that is, by considering first the 
competitive environment of the firm, and then by aligning strategy decisions in 
manufacturing with that environment. One of the most closely formulated approaches 
in this category is that of Hill (1993:36), who advocates five basic steps. First, define 
corporate objectives; second determine market strategies to meet those objectives; 
third, assess how different products win orders against competitors; fourth establish 
process choice; and fifth provide manufacturing infrastructure support. Key issues in 
this approach are that manufacturing strategy should be internally and externally 
consistent, and that it should explicitly contribute to competitive advantage (Hayes and 
Wheelwright, 1984:33). 
The second category is the bottom up version: which advocates a set of ideals and 
proposes specific actions for the firm to take. An example of a closely formulated 
approach here is that of Womack and Roos (1996). Again, five steps are needed. 
These are specie value; identify value stream; create continuous flow; introduce 
customer pull; and seek perfection by exposing muda. Thus Collins and Schmenner 
(1993) challenge the top down concept of ‘establishing a hierarchical list of 
competitive priorities and focusing exclusively on the top of the list’. World class 
competitors ‘have mastered quality, delivery, cost and flexibility’. And many authors, 
such as Hanson and Voss (1993, 1995), assume a clear and positive relationship 
between best practice - as evidenced by ‘world class’ metrics - and performance in the 
market place. 
Vigorous views have been expressed about the alternatives. Thus Hill (1993) dismisses 
bottom up versions as ‘panaceas’ and Japanese practices as the ‘latest in a long line of 
redundant solutions’. Porter (1996) has added his weight to this side in the debate: 
‘operational effectiveness is not a strategy’. On the other hand, Womack and Jones 
(1996:49) urge firms to ignore competitors and to ‘compete against perfection by 
identifying all activities that are muda and eliminating them’. 
More recent analyses of manufacturing strategy have proposed that there are linkages 
between the various extremes. Voss (1995) splits the top down approach into two 
(competing through manufacturing and strategic choices in manufacturing strategy), 
and refers to bottom up as ‘best practice’. ‘A company cannot ignore any of these 
completely, for it would risk losing its competitive strength in manufacturing’. A blend 
of all approaches is needed because ‘together they contain all that is required for an 
effective strategy’. Pointing to the lack of linkages in strategic models, Swink and 
Hegarty (1998) propose that manufacturing strategy research should move away fi-om 
studying the relationship between structures and performance and towards studying the 
core capabilities themselves. How can core capabilities be better understood, and how 
can such an understanding help to integrate the divergent views of manufacturing 
strategy development? The research described in this paper sought answers to such 
questions by studying the flow of materials in different operations contexts. In this 
paper, flow is defined as the quantity of materials (measured in input terms like litres or 
tonnes) fully processed through to finished product per unit of time. Flow was used as 
an integrative concept to describe an operating system in terms of human and technical 
factors that speed up flow (‘enablers’) and those that slow down flow (‘inhibitors’). 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
In order to explore the dynamics of an operating system and to investigate the social as 
well as the technical issues at stake, a case-based research design was developed. Case 
studies in organisational research have been described as a ‘research strategy’ in 
themselves (Hartley, 1994). Thus case-based research formed an appropriate 
‘umbrella’ strategy that encompassed quantitative instruments to evaluate the technical 
issues, and qualitative instruments to evaluate the social issues. The two sets of 
evidence could then be triangulated (Jick, 1979) in order to seek convergence between 
the different social and technical issues, to test for competing theories, and to add 
confidence to the results. Selection of case studies with very different operations 
environments would provide variety, and would hence test existing theory from very 
divergent directions. 
The two main case studies that were selected were Autoco (automotive assembly) and 
Filmco (manufacture of polypropylene film). Further contextual details of the two 
cases have been reported elsewhere (Harrison, 1998a and b). In both of the cases, a 
major package of organisational and work method changes had been introduced some 
3 years prior to the study. The impact of these changes was examined on different 
units of analysis within the same case study context, thereby ensuring that potential 
variables such as organisation structure and payment conditions were normalised by 
the research design. Units of analysis at Autoco were two model lines (Model A and 
Model B) which ran down the same trim and final assembly track, and at Filmco they 
were two process lines (Line 4 and Line 7) in different sections of the same factory. 
Thus comparative logic (Ragin, 1987) was an integral feature of the research design, 
and the units of analysis were selected within individual cases to display variety in the 
chosen measures of material flow. As indicated above, material flow is here defined as 
the quantity of material (measured in input terms such as units, tonnes or litres) which 
is fully processed through to finished product per unit of time in a given operating 
system. Investigation of the reasons for changes to flow makes it possible to measure 
enablers (features of an operating system which speed up flow) and inhibitors 
(features of an operating system which slow down flow). Examples of enablers are 
process and product simplicity, schedule stability and human constructs, which support 
reductions in inventory and throughput, time. Inhibitors have the opposite effect, and 
include process and product complexity, schedule instability and human constructs 
which are opposed to low inventories and short operations lead times. 
A number of research instruments were developed to study material flow in an 
operating system. These instruments were directed at measuring the following 
hypothesised independent variables: 
l capacity: the maximum conforming material flow (quantity of material processed 
per unit of time) for a given product in a given unit of analysis. 
l schedule uncertainty: the changes in demand for a given product in a given time 
bucket as it approaches the delivery due date (ie as the time bucket + zero) 
l equipment uptime: the availability of equipment in a given unit of analysis (total 
running hours less stop losses) 
l speed the actual material flow during running hours compared with capacity 
l quality: the nett conforming material flow after allowing for defects 
l process simplicity: the comparative throughput time (TT) and flow distance 
between one unit of analysis and another 
l product simplicity: the comparative number of raw materials and finished product 
offerings between one unit of analysis and another 
The above seven variables were not intended to form a comprehensive description of 
an operating system, but to facilitate a broad-based technical measurement which could 
be used to identify differences between the units of analysis. These differences would 
then demand explanation. (Equipment uptime, speed and quality have been grouped 
together as ‘overall equipment effectiveness’, OEE, Nakajima, 1988). 
In addition to the seven quantitative measures, two qualitative measures were 
developed to describe social constructs of an operating system. Evidence was 
collected by means of semi-structured interviews, which were transcribed and coded 
using methods described by Miles and Huberman (1994). Some 25 informants were 
selected opportunistically in each case environment following a detailed orientation 
review. The qualitative measures identified: 
l constructs of the impact of the change content on traditional operating practices. 
These were collected using the concept of a ‘core operations process’. The 
orientation review established what this process was in a given firm. A generic 
version of this process is shown in figure 1 (for a detailed description in Autoco, see 
Harrison, 1998a). The core operations process provided a boundary for the study, 
and facilitated the collection of qualitative data according to the major task 
categories within that process. While these varied somewhat by operations context, 
they fundamentally comprised pipeline scheduling (how many, when), process 
specifications (how), product specifications (what), short term scheduling (adjust), 
and the specific operations tasks (do). 
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Figure 1: Hypothesised Core Operations Process 
l constructs of the human control categories hypothesised to differentiate 
between types of operating system, detailed in the Shimada (1993) humanware 
model which describes the integration of machinery and human relations. The 
Shimada categories are self management, self inspection, continuous 
improvement, visibility of information, building quality into the process, and 
giving wisdom to the machine (through autonomation, error proofing and the 
like). 
By investigating both technical and social variables at the same time in the same case 
study environments, convergence between technical and social issues was sought. 
Rigour in Case Study Design 
A major concern with case study research is rigour in its design. Yin (1994:33) lists 
four tests commonly used to establish the quality of any empirical research, which are 
concerned with replicability. These were addressed in the research design as follows: 
l construct validity: operational measures were first established and tested in a pilot 
study, which has been reported earlier (Harrison, 1998~) 
l internal validity: by comparing units of analysis within the same case study 
environment, the aim was to neutralise the impact of extraneous contextual 
variables, such as organisational structure, and thereby to focus on differences 
between those units of analysis using the same research instruments 
l external validity: use of the same research instruments in each case facilitated cross 
case comparisons to be made on common criteria 
l reliability: was again facilitated by first proving the research methods in a  pilot 
study. Use of many instruments (7 quantitative and 2 qualitative) provided broad- 
based comparisons against which errors would be exposed. A second researcher 
independently carried out interpretation of qualitative evidence. 
A further concern with case study research is that of lack of generalisability. There 
was no statistical signif icance to the sampling logic behind the selection of cases or 
units of analysis - or for the selection of informants within the units of analysis. The 
underlying logic behind selection was that of creating sufficient variety for the 
constructs behind the manufacturing strategies at each firm  to be tested from very 
different viewpoints. The resulting generalisations are therefore analytical rather than 
statistical. Case study findings should be generalised to theory ‘analogous to the way 
a scientist generalises from experimental results to theory’ (Yin, 1994:37). 
RESULTS 
Table 1  collects together the main conclusions in much summarised format from the 
quantitative studies at Autoco (Models A and B) and Filmco (Lines 4 and 7). 
Collection of the data by means of the same research instruments facilitated the 
juxtaposition of evidence in this way: 
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Table 1: Comparing Enablers for Units of Analysis at Autoco and Filmco: 
Summary of Quantitative Evidence 
A. Capacity: the core operations process can be envisaged as a pipeline into which 
finite quantities of raw materials and data are loaded. Limits to the permitted 
quantities that can be processed within a given timescale are measured in output units 
(vehicles per hour at Autoco and tonnes per hour at Filmco). The assembly line at 
Autoco had the effect of integrating many assembly processes in the same way as film 
making at Filmco. Such integration has the effect of creating jkagility in the core 
process: a problem with a given activity affects the whole process. Loading on the 
assembly line at Autoco was heavier on model B because of its greater complexity and 
thus more intensive work cycle. Available capacity on the system was wasted when 
model A was run. On the other hand, load was continuous and high on the making 
processes on both lines at Filmco. But it was only intermittent on line 7 slitting and 
packing, which were only weakly integrated with making because of the effects of the 
‘lag store’ (between making and slitting) and the conveyor belts after slitting. 
Available capacity on these later processes was wasted by such problems as extension 
of effort by the operators. Overall, the demonstrated capacity of line 7 had been 
falling over the 2 years prior to the study, due to an accumulation of human, facility 
and management problems, as shown in figure 2: 
-e Line 4 l-l -w-Line 7 
Figure 2: Trend of Demonstrated Capacities for Lines 4 and 7 in Tonne&Month 
The other dimension of capacity, which was measured, was setups, which also reduce 
capacity. Thus changeovers on the BIW framing line at Autoco and rolls lost at 
Filmco during changeovers between different formulations consumed available running 
hours. Setups were of relatively short duration at Autoco and on line 7, but were a 
significant problem for line 4 where they not only reduced capacity but also reduced 
yield (quality). Demonstrated capacity can be viewed as the nett effect of ‘flow rate 
variables’ (Mather, 1988:18), which control a resource’s real capability to produce 
product. The pipeline is constricted by the combined effects of problems like 
breakdowns, shortages and rework. 
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Figure 3: Planned v Actual Volume Achievement for Models A  and B (Autoco) 
Turbulence was much less apparent at Filmco making processes because of the effect 
of a lo-day ‘frozen’ period in master scheduling. The core operations process was 
cushioned from the effects of instability in the market place. Allowing schedule 
instability like that on model B  at Filmco would not be practicable because there would 
be chaos on the making lines, and packaging materials (which are called up within the 
lo-day firm  period using super BOM’s) would be unavailable in spite of huge stocks. 
Thus the process at Filmco enforces discipline in manufacturing planning and control 
systems design and operation. 
C. Overall Equipment Effectiveness (OEE): a clear picture of the three components of 
OEE (uptime, speed losses and quality losses) was only obtained at Filmco, where they 
were already well documented. Thus at Autoco, OEE data was of doubtful value: 
system efficiency (actual v planned build) ran at around 89% on average, but 
contributions to the remaining 11% were many and variable. Quality losses were also 
doubtful in that errors in the assembly process were caught at a number of stages 
(within the team, at other track stations, and at off-track rectification), which did not 
incur production losses. Thus it was decided to use the internal QA audit scores for 
the two models as a substitute for quality losses: this was a quality measure that was 
clearly related to the specific units of analysis under study. The QA scores (16.5 for 
model A  and 23.9 for model B) showed further problems for model B, and highlighted 
issues of relative product complexity and difficulty of build. 
However, such difficulties of data collection should not rule out OEE as a measure. 
At Filmco, it had become the major measure of factory performance, and was thus well 
documented. It helped to contrast the two lines in terms of operating policies, which 
was important in providing evidence in terms of how they were being managed. Thus 
speed losses were shown to be particularly strongly related to OEE in the case of line 
7, which supported qualitative evidence given below. Further, OEE is closely related 
to demonstrated capacity, and can be used to identity the ‘flow rate variables’ referred 
to in A. above. 
D. Process Simplicity: geographical forces were at work at Filmco, where the north 
factory operation was more compact and integrated than south factory. Layout studies 
showed that line 4 involves much smaller areas for the team leader to supervise, and 
for team leaders and process technicians to coordinate with each other. Slitting and 
packing operations were an internal part of the process, kept under continuous 
pressure by the consistent performance of the making line. Thus, line 4 helped to show 
that improvements in output variables are enabled by geographical proximity. Line 7 
showed that the relative disconnection of slitting and packing, and the physical barrier 
of a fire wall in front of packing, were inhibitors. 
But process simplification can apply to more than process length reduction. Thus, line 
4 at Filmco showed the power of simplifying and standardising process specifications. 
Line 4 management had given top priority to removing sources of operator discretion 
as much as possible, for example by removing the wheels from the chain profile 
adjusters so that they could not be turned. 
E. Product Simplicity: this was a clear enabler at Autoco, where reduced raw material 
and finished product part numbers helped to facilitate lean logistics systems for model 
A. Reductions to numbers of finished products on line 4 at Filmco had been one of the 
enablers of improved performance stated by the management team (the others being 
engineering improvements to the line and the establishment and acceptance of standard 
conditions). However, line 4 still had a far greater product complexity than line 7, and 
this tended to drag down its performance because of more product changeovers. This 
was overcome by line 4’s superior performance in the other two areas. 
Enablers and Inhibitors to Flow: Qualitative Evidence 
Continuing the comparison of hypothesised enablers and inhibitors to flow, we next 
turn to the qualitative evidence. This is summarised in table 2, where evidence has 
been identified as enablers or inhibitors against the six categories of human control 
identified in the Shimada model. Comments have been labelled A (Autoco), or F 
(Filmco) to indicate their source. 
Self Management 
Se/f Inspection 
Continuous 
improvement 
Continuous 
Improvement - ctd 
visibility of 
Information 
l~.~~~~~.~~:~ 
multi-skilling means that you don’t 
have to wait for fitters: you get on with 
it(F) 
flexible systems that allow discretion 
(Model 9) 
cell members take over tasks like 
truck driving & scheduling (F) 
we’ve all been trained in QC (F) 
operator signoff (A, F) 
well documented process specs (A,F) 
ownership by all team members IF1 
.  I  
allow time fdr improvement projects 
F) 
major changes give teams plenty to 
get their teeth into (line 4) 
making the job easier (F) 
stable information (A, F) 
plenty of cameras, monitors; process 
control system (F) 
~~~~~~~~~~~ 
‘top jobs’ that are more highly skilled 
and which incumbents don’t want to 
relinquish (F) 
imposed, inflexible systems that 
cannot be changed (A) 
indirect tasks not delegated in 
assembly (A) 
functional barriers between logistics 
and production that mean you don’t 
flag up impending problems (A) 
imposed, inflexible systems that 
cannot be changed (A) 
ponderous PCR systems (A) 
end of life model (model 9) 
expensive projects (F) 
waning interest by mgm’t (F) 
team members who won’t buy in (F) 
full system was never explained 
(Model A) 
hidden processes (line 7 packing) 
Build Qua/Q into the operator flexibility creates greater poor quality in making cannot be 
Process awareness (F) recovered in slitting (F) 
mgm’t actions: eg capital spend that mgm’t actions that promote quantity 
proves quality is top priority (F) over quality (A) 
Give Wisdom to the rigid system, clear rules (A) last minute changes, poor 
Machine robust process: tell tales, operator documentation (A) 
checks, machine checks (A) fragile processes where many 
standard conditions (F) variables must be controlled (F) 
pressure/overload (F) 
Table 2: Comparing Enablers and Inhibitors - Summary of Qualitative Evidence 
A. Self Management: empowerment of the operator to manage the process was 
enabled by multi-skilling so that cell members could take over indirect tasks such as 
maintenance, truck driving and cell scheduling. I heard no dissenting views expressed 
across the 2 cases: people mostly found such changes motivating. The model B  system 
at Autoco allowed more self management because it was more flexible and totally 
under Autoco’s control: the production system on model A  was seen as imposed from 
outside and as unduly inflexible. This is an example of the contradiction between 
enablers to which I return later: when it came to giving wisdom to the machine, the 
roles were reversed, and it was the rigidity of the model A  system that was perceived 
to be better than the license of the model B  system. But multi-skilling had its 
limitations: team leaders at Filmco felt that excessive flexibility was counter-productive 
and created ‘jacks of all trades, masters of none’. 
B. SelfInspection: Filmco had gone a long way to remove barriers between direct and 
indirect tasks, and cross-training had been an important enabler to this end. Autoco 
still had much to do in this area: for example, production teams and logistics teams 
were largely independent of each other. 
C. Continuous Improvement: this category is enabled by the challenges of change and 
ownership. Thus focusing the factory into two business units gave Filmco teams the 
incentive to improve their own processes: operation restructure had left the teams 
straddling all lines with an unclear sense of ownership. TPM projects waxed when 
teams worked on their own problem issues, had the time allocated to do so, and 
involved all team members. They waned when team members felt no sense of 
appreciation for their work, and when lengthy delays were created by delays in 
approving major project spend. While some people I had spoken to did not want to 
get involved in improvement projects, those who did felt that making life easier for 
themselves was an incentive in itself. This contradicted the views of Turnbull 
(1988: 18) and others that work is intensified under JIT, and that added stress is 
‘endemic in the system’. 
D. Visibility of Information: stability of process control and product information was 
quoted at both Autoco and Filmco as being a desirable state. It was essential that such 
documentation was easy to read and available on the shop floor for production 
personnel in the presence of a high level of labour flexibility. As might be expected, 
the relatively technical Filmco processes were not only well documented but also made 
very visible through the process control system, and through liberal use of aids such as 
cameras and mirrors. Poor visibility of the new systems for model B  at Autoco had 
been a longstanding problem, which created lack of coordination between activities. 
Lack of visibility of the line 7 packing operation at Filmco led to weak supervision and 
poor control. This inhibitor was sufficiently strong to overcome the self management 
enabler. 
E. Build Quality into the Process: cross training helped to build quality into multi- 
activity processes as a result of wider process understanding. This was apparent in 
both of the lines at Filmco, where linestop authority had long been a factor for safety 
reasons, although it was a more recent innovation at Autoco. Such management 
support that quality comes first was fundamental to this enabler. Equally, the 
traditional importance of numbers was an inhibitor at Autoco. 
F. Give Wisdom to the Machine: the rigid and uncompromising rules were features of 
the model A system at Autoco that enabled wisdom to be nurtured (‘do it the same 
way the same time every time’). This was further enabled by product design that 
meant a component could only be fitted one way. Line 4 at Filmco had approached 
this category by introducing standard conditions. Wherever possible, fixed line 
conditions were introduced and the discretion of the operator removed. In a 
potentially multi-variate process, this helps to narrow the field considerably in the 
event of trouble. There is an apparent inconsistency here with self management, which 
requires later analysis. Filmco also provided examples of inhibitors to this category in 
the packing area of line 4, where work overloads caused activities like check weighing 
the reels to be missed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Based on this hypothesised core process, evidence can be collected to indicate how it 
may be enabled and inhibited in terms of the basic task of converting data into 
materials. A summary of evidence collected from the case studies is shown in table 3: 
Medium Term 
Production 
Planning 
Product 
Specifications 
Process 
Short Term 
Production 
Planning 
~~~~~.~:~~,~~.~:~~ 
long campaign lengths, large batch 
sizes 
contained variety - fewer ways to get 
the forecast wrong, fewer changeovers 
flexibility to reconfigure supply to 
demand as late as possible 
fewer product specs, contained variety 
fewer components 
variety yes, complexity no 
standard conditions (line 4) 
error proof processes: only one way to 
make/build (Model A) 
simple processes, fewer standard 
containers, no preparation needed 
no changes to medium term plan 
(Model A) 
process reliability (line 4) 
pressure from preceding operations to 
perform (line 4 slitting & packing) 
lona ‘firm’ Deriods create distance from 
mayket demand (Model A) 
uncertainty of true operations capability 
(line 7) 
incompatibility between product spec 
systems (Model A v Model B) 
ponderous PCR systems that slow 
down change (Autoco) 
product complexity * process 
complexity j low productivity, 
conformance quality 
lack of process knowledge (line 7) 
inconsistent process development 
backing at Filmco) 
incomplete campaigns/stragglers 
obstinacy over permitted changes 
means responsiveness & (model A) 
process unreliability (line 7) 
lack of pressure (line 7 slitting & 
packing) 
Operations process integration, short distances 
between processes (line 4) 
schedule and process stability 
over complex equipment * more 
breakdowns, MTTR? (line 7) 
pushing facilities beyond their 
capabilities (line 7) 
Table 3: Enablers and Inhibitors in Core Operations Processes 
This list of enablers and inhibitors contains few surprises from a point of view of OM 
theory. But what is more problematic is to sort out what is the best set of tactical 
decisions in a given operations situation. There is an apparent difference between how 
the enablers and inhibitors might be applied. Three categories can be advanced: 
l tradeoffs: where an enabler is good for creating operations advantage in one area 
only to cause inhibition in another. For example, long ‘firm ’ schedule periods are 
good for supply chain and operations stability, but bad for market responsiveness 
(Model A  at Autoco). 
l bestpractice: where an enabler is clearly the best course of action in any operations 
situation, and the equivalent inhibitor is clearly less competitive. Thus process 
reliability is always better (more competitive) than process unreliability (line 4 
example). 
l speczjk: where an enabler creates an operations advantage in a given (specific) 
operations situation. Thus batch build of 30 derivatives at a time for model A  at 
Autoco was consequent on the ‘long firm  schedule’ enabler, and could not have 
been applied without that enabler and reduction in the number of derivatives. Batch 
build combined with pallet factors of 30 was a major enabler of synchronised flow 
in the supply chain. Such enablers do not have equivalent inhibitors (unless the 
advantages are to be discarded!) 
The first category aligns with Schmenner and Swink’s (1998) law of tradeoffs which a 
recognises that a manufacturing plant cannot simultaneously provide the highest levels 
among all competitors of product quality, flexibility and delivery at the lowest 
manufactured cost. The second category (‘best practice’) aligns with their law of 
cumulative capabilities, which recognises that improvements in certain manufacturing 
capabilities (eg quality) are basic and enable improvements to be made more easily in 
other manufacturing capabilities (eg flexibility). However, Schmenner and Swink have 
nothing to encompass specific enablers, and their theory of operations management is 
incomplete in a number of other respects. Firstly, their claim that ‘the law of tradeoffs 
is reflected in comparisons across plants at a given point in time’ is not borne out by 
the evidence from the research described in this paper. Tradeoffs are no less dynamic 
than ‘cumulative capabilities’, which they describe as ‘reflected in improvement within 
individual plants over time’. Secondly, Schmenner and Swink do not recognise the 
possibility that their laws are not complementary, and have boundary conditions in 
practice. The ‘laws’ also have negative conjugates, which are better described by my 
concept of inhibitors. 
Some inhibitors do not have enabler equivalents. Thus ‘pushing facilities beyond their 
capabilities’ was due to a series of actions taken by line 7 management team aimed at 
increasing linespeed. Instead of improving capacity and productivity, this action was in 
fact creating a vicious cycle of inhibition such as more downtime and reduced pressure 
on slitting and packing, the reverse of what was intended. Thus we can distinguish 
three types of inhibitor corresponding to the enablers listed above: 
l tradeoffs: the negative conjugate of the enabler category above. These are 
inhibitors that are caused by enablers in a different operations area (such as market 
remoteness of Model A caused by lengthy stable schedule periods). 
l bad practice: where an inhibitor creates anti-competitive properties in the 
operations system. Unfortunately, this may not be apparent to the management of 
the day, as in the line 7 linespeed example just given. 
l specific: where an inhibitor has been allowed to develop in a specific situation. An 
example is the ‘anarchic’ packing process at Filmco, which does not fit with the 
continuous film making and large batch slitting process types that precede it. 
Maximising enablers in a given core operations process is therefore something of a 
minefield, which demands optimising tradeoffs and taking advantage of best practice 
and specific enabler possibilities where possible. It also demands avoiding or rooting 
out worst practice and specific inhibitors. However logical this may appear, such 
action had not been systematically applied in the cases studied, and as a result had left 
a trail of unresolved problems and inconsistencies in the operationalisation of 
manufacturing strategy. 
The Hypothesised Humanware Model 
The hypothesised core operations process analysed in the previous section also acted 
as the boundary for the qualitative studies. Here, the framework was the hypothesised 
Japanese ‘humanware’ model, which was used to determine the coding categories for 
the qualitative research analysed in Table 2 above. Human control enabler and 
inhibitor categories can be advanced, which are analogous to the quantitative 
categories based on the core operations process listed in table 3. The proposed human 
control enabler categories are: 
l tradeoffs: which enable human control in one area only to cause inhibition in 
another. Thus a rigid material planning system was good for ‘giving wisdom to the 
machine’ in that a consistent, unchanging production programme was broadcast to 
everyone who worked in the system. But the very rigidity that was good for 
‘wisdom’ was bad for self management, where the inflexibility cramped initiative. 
This conclusion mirrors that of Klein (1991), who comments on the clash between 
autonomy and discpline. 
l best practice: where a human control enabler is clearly best practice in any 
situation. Thus teambuilding and flexibility are common enablers across the three 
cases that facilitated greater process understanding and sensitivity: ‘we look out for 
each other more’. 
l specific: human control enablers that may be applied opportunistically in a given 
situation. Thus re-grouping work teams around product lines created an enhanced 
feeling of familiarity and ownership at Filmco. 
Similar arguments can be advanced about human control inhibitors: 
l tradeoffs: the negative conjugate of tradeoff enablers. Tradeoff inhibitors are the 
downside of enablers that may appear to possess only positive benefits. While the 
Model A production system used at Filmco was orderly and disciplined, it provided 
little opportunity for operators to use their initiative. 
l bad practice: are inhibitors, which lead to anti-competitive behaviour in any 
operations system. An example was Cmctional barriers that inhibit process 
integration, such as observed between logistics operations and the assembly 
operatives at Autoco. 
l specific: are inhibitors, which lead to anti-competitive behaviour in specific 
situations. For example, comparative lack of process change led to inhibition in the 
line 7 packing operation at Filmco. 
Thus it is possible to argue that maximising human control enablers is also a potential 
minefield. It is for example doubtful if all of the ramifications of the package of 
organisational and work method changes at Autoco were thought through in terms of 
what was needed from operatives who were to assemble model A when it was added 
to the traditional model B production system. Or whether the impact of one model 
that demanded high levels of self management (Model B) on one that demanded 
unquestioning discipline (Model A) was also considered when both had to be 
produced on the same system. 
Implications to Practitioners 
The evidence presented in this paper catalogues issues of implementing manufacturing 
strategy ‘at the coal face’ in two very different f%rns. W ithin both firms, substantial 
differences in performance between two comparable units of analysis arose following 
implementation of the same package of changes. These differences raise important 
implementation issues from a practitioner perspective. First, re-focusing the factory 
into smaller, more autonomous units is no guarantee that manufacturing performance 
will improve. Line 7 at Autoco followed a results-oriented implementation 
programme, where the emphasis was on increasing linespeed. Performance in terms of 
output tonnage/day worsened by more than 20% from the time that the package of 
changes was introduced. Line 4 followed a process improvement route, and 
developed increasing output capability. I formed a similar conclusion from earlier 
research into implementation of cellular manufacturing (Harrison, 1998c). Thus, 
implementation of ‘new wave’ manufacturing methods and innovative HR policies may 
lead to performance reduction. Second, the development of manufacturing capabilities 
can be viewed in terms of enablers and inhibitors referred to above. This problematises 
the relationship between ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ versions of strategy 
development, and demands that boundary conditions between tradeoffs and best 
practice are understood in both technical and human terms. 
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